The
readings from Thibault Martin and Steven M. Hoffman’s (2008) Power Struggles: Hydro Development and First
Nations in Manitoba and Quebec, and from
Mario Blaser et.al.’s (2004) In the Way
of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects, and Globalization,
examine hydro electric projects in Quebec and Manitoba and their impacts on
First Nations people and their lands . As with other development projects,
these hydro projects are business and profit orientated, undertaken with the
goal of sustaining the economic viability of the provinces. Although these
projects included formal agreements which guaranteed a commitment on the part
of the corporations to protect the environment and to respect indigenous
culture and needs, the impact of the development projects on the lives of the
indigenous people as well as on their lands is viewed differently by the
various authors. The readings from Blaser
et al. focus on Hydro Quebec, the province of Quebec and their relationship to
the James Bay Cree.
Because
of the Government of Canada’s long history of relations with indigenous people,
their involvement in these projects should have made these projects more
sensitive to indigenous cultures and their needs as a people as opposed to
projects initiated by the private sector. However, according to Harvey A.
Feit’s article “James Bay Crees’ Life Projects and Politics: Histories of
Place, Animal Partners and Enduring Relationships,” in Blaser et al. (2004),
this has not been the case. The James Bay Cree have continued to extend their
hand in reconciliation, seeking the re-creation of mutual understanding with
the province and Hydro Quebec to improve
their relationship with the Cree and the land: to view the Cree ontology (p.
103).
Mathew Coon
Come, in his article “Survival in the Context of Mega Resource Development:
Experiences of the James Bay Crees and the First Nations of Canada,” in Blaser
et al. (2004), concedes that the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA)
was not a good agreement. Although its intention was good, its implementation
process needed court interpretations; therefore the Cree were forced to become
the environmental and economic conscience that the Quebec government did not
have. Coon Come concludes that this agreement can benefit northern Crees as it
provides some financial resources for their future. This agreement is often
referred to the first modern day land claims agreement (pp. 159-60).
According to
Brian Craik, in his article, “The Importance of Working Together: Exclusions,
Conflicts and Participation in James Bay, Quebec,” in Blaser et al. (2004),
Canada has a huge problem with its present land claim policy and with the
future of Aboriginal communities. Craik proclaims the Canadian policy is one of
maintaining the status quo rather than bringing Aboriginal communities into the
revenue streams created by the development that surrounds them, which is
evident in their promoting one time buy outs and asking Aboriginal peoples to
accept exclusion (pp. 183-184).
The articles
summarized above in Blaser et al. (2004) paint a clearer picture of the
negative social and legal impacts of the JBNQA while the readings from Martin
and Hoffman (2008) hold up the JBNQA as a successful model of development on
indigenous lands and contrast it to the Northern Flood Agreement (NFA) in
Manitoba. The difference between the JBNQA in Quebec and the Northern Flood Agreement (NFA) in
Manitoba, according to Martin and Hoffman (2008) and as indicated in reading
summary one, is that development has meant a "new social contract"
for the James Bay Cree in contrast to the "business only
partnerships" approach Manitoba Hydro has taken toward Manitoba Cree
communities (p. 3). In “The Way to Modern Treaties: A Review of Hydro Projects
and Agreements in Manitoba and Quebec,” in Martin and Hoffman (2008), Romuald
Wera and Thibault Martin state, “[u]nlike the JBNQA, the NFA recognized no
inherent Aboriginal right but instead created a claims procedure requiring a
long and usually unsuccessful, at least from the Aboriginal point of view,
arbitration process” (p. 66). Wera and Martin (2008) further point out that the
Aboriginal communities were so disappointed by the implementation process that
by the mid-1980s the provincial government entered into negotiations with each
community for an alternative, comprehensive approach (p. 69). In Manitoba, the
Summary of Understanding (SOU 2003) came after the aspirations of the NFA could
not be implemented in Nelson House, and the province intended to proceed on
with more hydro development.
According to Peter
Kulchyski, in his article “A Step Back: The Nisichiawayasihk Cree Nation,” in
Martinand Hoffman (2008)the NFA has strength from the Constitution Act (section 35) that “[h]ereby
recognizes and affirms the existing aboriginal and treaty rights.” Further supported by two Supreme
Court Decisions, R v. Sioui (1990) and R v. Marshall have drastically altered the understanding and the
protocol of treaty interpretation; this set an important precedent to allocate a liberal and generous
interpretation of treaty putting oral history and what was agreed to in treaty on par with with what was
written in the Treaty Five document (p. 131-132). He goes on to criticize the SOU further by comparing
it to the Paix Des Braves (2002) in Quebec, claiming “the document is not a nation-to-nation agreement
in the manner of the Paix Des Braves . . . and contains no sense of vision. Various Cree Communities in
northern Quebec will gain significant financial benefit, $70 million a year for fifty years to a total of $3.5
billion, without financial risk” (pp. 136-137). The Paix Des Braves agreement in Quebec also came after
the JBNQA, just as the SOU came after the NFA in Manitoba, to pave the way for more hydro
development.
No comments:
Post a Comment